TY - JOUR
T1 - Reconsidering the counter-mobilization hypothesis
T2 - Health policy lobbying in the American states
AU - Lowery, David
AU - Gray, Virginia
AU - Wolak, Jennifer
AU - Godwin, Erik
AU - Kilburn, Whitt
N1 - Funding Information:
David Lowery, Department of Public Administration, University of Leiden, Leiden, RB2300, The Netherlands ([email protected]). Virginia Gray, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. Jennifer Wolak, Department fo Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA. Erik Godwin, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA.Whitt Kilburn, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA An earlier version of this paper was prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2004. This research was supported by a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Investigator Award in Health Policy Research (ID#047727).
PY - 2005/6
Y1 - 2005/6
N2 - Despite its widespread use since the concept was introduced by David Truman (1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf), counter-mobilization by organized interests has remained theoretically ambiguous and rarely studied empirically. We more fully develop the concept of short-term counter-mobilization, distinguish it from long-term counter-mobilization, specify the conditions under which we might observe short-term counter-mobilization, and test the resulting hypotheses with data on health care lobby registrations in the American states during the late 1990s. We find little evidence of short-term counter-mobilization among health interest organizations, which leads us to more fully consider several null hypotheses about the limits of strategic behavior on the part of organized interests.
AB - Despite its widespread use since the concept was introduced by David Truman (1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf), counter-mobilization by organized interests has remained theoretically ambiguous and rarely studied empirically. We more fully develop the concept of short-term counter-mobilization, distinguish it from long-term counter-mobilization, specify the conditions under which we might observe short-term counter-mobilization, and test the resulting hypotheses with data on health care lobby registrations in the American states during the late 1990s. We find little evidence of short-term counter-mobilization among health interest organizations, which leads us to more fully consider several null hypotheses about the limits of strategic behavior on the part of organized interests.
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U2 - 10.1007/s11109-005-4055-8
DO - 10.1007/s11109-005-4055-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:18844415108
SN - 0190-9320
VL - 27
SP - 99
EP - 132
JO - Political Behavior
JF - Political Behavior
IS - 2
ER -
