TY - JOUR
T1 - Regional debt in monetary unions
T2 - Is it inflationary?
AU - Cooper, Russell
AU - Kempf, Hubert
AU - Peled, Dan
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to the CNRS and the NSF for financial support. Cooper thanks the Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for its support. Helpful comments and questions from Maria Alzua, Marco Bassetto, Micha Ben-Gad, Eddie Dekel, Etienne Farvaque, Patrick Kehoe, Todd Keister, Robert E. Lucas, Henri Pagès, John Shea, and Yoram Weiss, as well as seminar participants at the European Central Bank, the Banque de France, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, the Bank of Israel, the University of Maryland, Tel Aviv University, the University of Haifa, the Anglo-French seminar in macroeconomics, the European University Institute, the University of Pavia and the University of Bologna are very much appreciated. Comments and suggestions from Referees and the Editor of the EER are appreciated as well.
PY - 2010/4
Y1 - 2010/4
N2 - This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Is this debt simply backed by future taxation with no inflationary consequences? Or will the circulation of region debt induce monetization by a central bank? We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy, there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of regional debt holdings. We show that regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits. We use the model to assess the impact of some policy measures within a monetary union as well as dollarization.
AB - This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Is this debt simply backed by future taxation with no inflationary consequences? Or will the circulation of region debt induce monetization by a central bank? We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy, there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of regional debt holdings. We show that regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits. We use the model to assess the impact of some policy measures within a monetary union as well as dollarization.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77649233857&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77649233857&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.08.010
DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.08.010
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77649233857
SN - 0014-2921
VL - 54
SP - 345
EP - 358
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
IS - 3
ER -