TY - GEN
T1 - Relay-centric two-hop networks with asymmetric wireless energy transfer
T2 - 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018
AU - Leng, Shiyang
AU - Yener, Aylin
N1 - Funding Information:
This work is sponsored in part by NSF ECCS-1748725.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018/7/27
Y1 - 2018/7/27
N2 - This paper studies a two-hop network with wireless energy transfer consisting of one source, multiple relays, and multiple destinations. The relays' main objective is to communicate their own messages to their own destinations. The message of each relay is transmitted to its associated destination along with the source's information that is intended for the same destination. As an incentive for relaying, the source offers wireless energy transfer to the relays via radio frequency signals. The relays harvest energy and receive information one by one. The relays that are further down in the order in which they are powered incur delay, but are able to harvest from previous time slots and thus are able to accumulate more energy until it is their turn to transmit, thus establishing an energy-delay trade-off. We formulate a multi-leader-follower Stackelberg game to capture the self-interest and hierarchically competing nature of the nodes. The relay-destination pairs play as leaders and the source-destination pairs as followers. We incorporate data rate, energy cost and delay in the utility functions. The existence and the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) are proved, and two algorithms that achieve SE in centralized and distributed fashion are provided. Numerical results verify analytical findings.
AB - This paper studies a two-hop network with wireless energy transfer consisting of one source, multiple relays, and multiple destinations. The relays' main objective is to communicate their own messages to their own destinations. The message of each relay is transmitted to its associated destination along with the source's information that is intended for the same destination. As an incentive for relaying, the source offers wireless energy transfer to the relays via radio frequency signals. The relays harvest energy and receive information one by one. The relays that are further down in the order in which they are powered incur delay, but are able to harvest from previous time slots and thus are able to accumulate more energy until it is their turn to transmit, thus establishing an energy-delay trade-off. We formulate a multi-leader-follower Stackelberg game to capture the self-interest and hierarchically competing nature of the nodes. The relay-destination pairs play as leaders and the source-destination pairs as followers. We incorporate data rate, energy cost and delay in the utility functions. The existence and the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) are proved, and two algorithms that achieve SE in centralized and distributed fashion are provided. Numerical results verify analytical findings.
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U2 - 10.1109/ICC.2018.8422085
DO - 10.1109/ICC.2018.8422085
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85051438174
SN - 9781538631805
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
BT - 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 20 May 2018 through 24 May 2018
ER -