TY - JOUR
T1 - Risk and reciprocity in Meriam food sharing
AU - Bliege Bird, Rebecca
AU - Bird, Douglas W.
AU - Smith, Eric Alden
AU - Kushnick, Geoffrey C.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank the Meriam community foremost, especially Chairman Ron Day for his foresight and tolerance, our Meriam families, particularly the Passis, and all of the foragers who volunteered information and invited us on hunting and fishing trips. We also wish to acknowledge the invaluable field assistance of Andrew Passi, Dalcy Gibas, Ron “Sonny” Passi, Edna Kabere, and Del Passi. Craig Hadley has been a vital participant in this project, particularly in collecting sharing data on Mer. We are especially grateful to John Beaton, Jim O'Connell, and Kristen Hawkes for their support and encouragement. Research in 1998–1999 was supported by NSF grant SBR-9616096 to RBB and EAS, NSF grant SBR-9616887 to DWB and EAS, and research in 1994–1995 was supported by grants to RBB and DWB from AIATSIS, the L. S. B. Leakey Foundation, the Wenner Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, and a NSF predoctoral fellowship to RBB and a NSF Dissertation Improvement Grant to DWB. GCK was funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation during part of his involvement in the project. For very helpful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript, we thank Elizabeth Cashdan, Michael Gurven, and Alan Rogers.
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - Foragers who do not practice food storage might adapt to fluctuating food supplies by sharing surplus resources in times of plenty with the expectation of receiving in times of shortfall. In this paper, we derive a number of predictions from this perspective, which we term the risk reduction reciprocity (RRR) model, and test these with ethnographic data on foraging (fishing, shellfish collecting, and turtle hunting) among the Meriam (Torres Strait, Australia). While the size of a harvest strongly predicts that a portion will be shared beyond the household of the acquirer, the effects of key measures of foraging risk (e.g., failure rate) are comparatively weak: Harvests from high-risk hunt types are usually shared more often than those from low-risk hunt types in the same macropatch, but increases in risk overall do not accurately predict increases in the probability of sharing. In addition, free-riders (those who take shares but do not reciprocate) are not discriminated against, those who share more often and more generously do not predictably receive more, and most sharing relationships between households (over 80%) involve one-way flows.
AB - Foragers who do not practice food storage might adapt to fluctuating food supplies by sharing surplus resources in times of plenty with the expectation of receiving in times of shortfall. In this paper, we derive a number of predictions from this perspective, which we term the risk reduction reciprocity (RRR) model, and test these with ethnographic data on foraging (fishing, shellfish collecting, and turtle hunting) among the Meriam (Torres Strait, Australia). While the size of a harvest strongly predicts that a portion will be shared beyond the household of the acquirer, the effects of key measures of foraging risk (e.g., failure rate) are comparatively weak: Harvests from high-risk hunt types are usually shared more often than those from low-risk hunt types in the same macropatch, but increases in risk overall do not accurately predict increases in the probability of sharing. In addition, free-riders (those who take shares but do not reciprocate) are not discriminated against, those who share more often and more generously do not predictably receive more, and most sharing relationships between households (over 80%) involve one-way flows.
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U2 - 10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00098-3
DO - 10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00098-3
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036297894
SN - 1090-5138
VL - 23
SP - 297
EP - 321
JO - Evolution and Human Behavior
JF - Evolution and Human Behavior
IS - 4
ER -