Roaming charges for customers of cellular-wireless entrant providers

G. Kesidis, D. Mercer, C. Griffin, S. Fdida

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a simple two-player game involving a large incumbent and small entrant into a cellular wireless access provider marketplace. The entrant’s customers must pay roaming charges. We assume that the roaming charges are regulated to prevent an incumbent from creating barriers to entry in the marketplace. The game is studied at its Nash equilibrium. A roaming charge is identified that is arguably fair in the sense that revenues for the access providers are proportionate to their infrastructure costs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
Volume2015-January
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
EventIEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS 2015 - Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Duration: Apr 26 2015May 1 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Computer Science
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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