Rothschild-Stiglitz competitive insurance market under quasilinear preferences

Shouyong Shi

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(88)90214-5

Rothschild-Stiglitz competitive insurance market under quasilinear preferences

Shouyong Shi

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a heterogeneous agents economy under quasilinear preferences, if preferences are unidirectional, the pooling equilibrium may exist. If so, it is Pareto optimal; if not, the separating equilibrium (which is Pareto optimal) may or may not exist depending on preferences. If the preferences are multidirectional, the pooling equilibrium always exist and is Pareto optimal.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	27-30
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	27
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90214-5
State	Published - Jan 1 1988

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(88)90214-5

Cite this

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title = "Rothschild-Stiglitz competitive insurance market under quasilinear preferences",

abstract = "In a heterogeneous agents economy under quasilinear preferences, if preferences are unidirectional, the pooling equilibrium may exist. If so, it is Pareto optimal; if not, the separating equilibrium (which is Pareto optimal) may or may not exist depending on preferences. If the preferences are multidirectional, the pooling equilibrium always exist and is Pareto optimal.",

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AB - In a heterogeneous agents economy under quasilinear preferences, if preferences are unidirectional, the pooling equilibrium may exist. If so, it is Pareto optimal; if not, the separating equilibrium (which is Pareto optimal) may or may not exist depending on preferences. If the preferences are multidirectional, the pooling equilibrium always exist and is Pareto optimal.

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Rothschild-Stiglitz competitive insurance market under quasilinear preferences

Abstract

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