Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners

Kalyan Chatterjee; Bhaskar Dutta

doi:10.1006/game.1997.0617

Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners

Kalyan Chatterjee, Bhaskar Dutta

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that prevail in thin markets, as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined. Three trading processes or bargaining procedures are described. In all the variants that we consider, except for one case of public offers, either there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium or such equilibria exhibit delay in reaching agreement.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	119-145
Number of pages	27
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	23
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0617
State	Published - May 1 1998

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/game.1997.0617

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Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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