Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that prevail in thin markets. as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined. Three trading processes or bargaining procedures are described. In all the variants that we consider, except for one case of public offers, either there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium or such equilibria exhibit delay in reaching agreement. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market |
| Subtitle of host publication | Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining |
| Publisher | World Scientific Publishing Co. |
| Pages | 51-78 |
| Number of pages | 28 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9789814447577 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9814447560, 9789814447560 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2013 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- General Mathematics