TY - GEN
T1 - Secure Quantum Circuit Compilation Methodology for Untrusted Compilers
AU - Das, Subrata
AU - Ghosh, Swaroop
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 IEEE.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - The success of quantum circuits in providing reliable outcomes for a given problem depends on the gate count and depth in near-term noisy quantum computers. A circuit (that implements a given function) with a low gate count and short depth is more likely to give a correct solution than the circuit variant with a higher gate count and depth. As such, quantum circuit compilers that decompose high-level gates to native gates of the hardware and optimize the circuit play a key role in quantum computing. However, the quality and time complexity of the optimization process can vary significantly especially for practically relevant large-scale quantum circuits. As a result, third-party (often less-trusted/untrusted/unreliable) compilers have emerged, claiming to provide better and faster optimization of complex quantum circuits than so-called trusted compilers. However, untrusted compilers, with their varying adversarial motives ranging from semi-honest to malicious can pose severe security risks such as counterfeiting the sensitive intellectual property (IP) embedded within the quantum circuit. We propose an obfuscation technique for quantum circuits using randomized reversible gates to protect them from such attacks during compilation. The idea is to insert a small random circuit into the original circuit and send it to the untrusted compiler. Since the circuit function is corrupted, the adversary (i.e., an untrusted compiler) may get incorrect IP. However, the user may also get incorrect output post-compilation (even though highly optimized). To circumvent this issue, we concatenate the inverse of the random circuit in the compiled circuit to recover the original functionality. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by conducting exhaustive experiments on a set of benchmark circuits and measuring the quality of obfuscation by calculating the Total Variation Distance (TVD) and Degree of Functional Corruption (DFC) metrics. Our method achieves TVD of up to 1.92, indicating substantial functional corruption, and performs at least 2 x better than a previously reported obfuscation method. We also attained a DFC as low as -0.75, approaching the -1 score that represents maximal functional corruption, further ensuring the robustness of our proposed method against counterfeiting. We also propose a novel adversarial reverse engineering (RE) approach and show that the proposed obfuscation is resilient against RE attacks. The proposed technique introduces minimal degradation in fidelity (∼ 1% to ∼ 3% on average).
AB - The success of quantum circuits in providing reliable outcomes for a given problem depends on the gate count and depth in near-term noisy quantum computers. A circuit (that implements a given function) with a low gate count and short depth is more likely to give a correct solution than the circuit variant with a higher gate count and depth. As such, quantum circuit compilers that decompose high-level gates to native gates of the hardware and optimize the circuit play a key role in quantum computing. However, the quality and time complexity of the optimization process can vary significantly especially for practically relevant large-scale quantum circuits. As a result, third-party (often less-trusted/untrusted/unreliable) compilers have emerged, claiming to provide better and faster optimization of complex quantum circuits than so-called trusted compilers. However, untrusted compilers, with their varying adversarial motives ranging from semi-honest to malicious can pose severe security risks such as counterfeiting the sensitive intellectual property (IP) embedded within the quantum circuit. We propose an obfuscation technique for quantum circuits using randomized reversible gates to protect them from such attacks during compilation. The idea is to insert a small random circuit into the original circuit and send it to the untrusted compiler. Since the circuit function is corrupted, the adversary (i.e., an untrusted compiler) may get incorrect IP. However, the user may also get incorrect output post-compilation (even though highly optimized). To circumvent this issue, we concatenate the inverse of the random circuit in the compiled circuit to recover the original functionality. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by conducting exhaustive experiments on a set of benchmark circuits and measuring the quality of obfuscation by calculating the Total Variation Distance (TVD) and Degree of Functional Corruption (DFC) metrics. Our method achieves TVD of up to 1.92, indicating substantial functional corruption, and performs at least 2 x better than a previously reported obfuscation method. We also attained a DFC as low as -0.75, approaching the -1 score that represents maximal functional corruption, further ensuring the robustness of our proposed method against counterfeiting. We also propose a novel adversarial reverse engineering (RE) approach and show that the proposed obfuscation is resilient against RE attacks. The proposed technique introduces minimal degradation in fidelity (∼ 1% to ∼ 3% on average).
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105030188322
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105030188322#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1109/QCE65121.2025.00239
DO - 10.1109/QCE65121.2025.00239
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105030188322
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE Quantum Week 2025, QCE 2025
SP - 2191
EP - 2201
BT - Technical Papers Program
A2 - Culhane, Candace
A2 - Byrd, Greg
A2 - Muller, Hausi
A2 - Delgado, Andrea
A2 - Eidenbenz, Stephan
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 6th IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering, QCE 2025
Y2 - 31 August 2025 through 5 September 2025
ER -