Security games with market insurance

Benjamin Johnson; Rainer Böhme; Jens Grossklags

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_11

Security games with market insurance

Benjamin Johnson, Rainer Böhme, Jens Grossklags

Penn State University Park

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

36 Scopus citations

Abstract

Security games are characterized by multiple players who strategically adjust their defenses against an abstract attacker, represented by realizations of nature. The defense strategies include both actions where security generates positive externalities and actions that do not. When the players are assumed to be risk averse, market insurance enters as a third strategic option. We formulate a one-shot security game with market insurance, characterize its pure equilibria, and describe how the equilibria compare to established results. Simplifying assumptions include homogeneous players, fair insurance premiums, and complete information except for realizations of nature. The results add more realism to the interpretation of analytical models of security games and might inform policy makers on adjusting incentives to improve network security and foster the development of a market for cyber-insurance.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Decision and Game Theory for Security - Second International Conference, GameSec 2011, Proceedings
Pages	117-130
Number of pages	14
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_11
State	Published - 2011
Event	2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011 - College Park, MD, United States Duration: Nov 14 2011 → Nov 15 2011

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	7037 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Other

Other	2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011
Country/Territory	United States
City	College Park, MD
Period	11/14/11 → 11/15/11

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_11

Cite this

Johnson, B., Böhme, R., & Grossklags, J. (2011). Security games with market insurance. In Decision and Game Theory for Security - Second International Conference, GameSec 2011, Proceedings (pp. 117-130). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7037 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_11

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Johnson, B, Böhme, R & Grossklags, J 2011, Security games with market insurance. in Decision and Game Theory for Security - Second International Conference, GameSec 2011, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7037 LNCS, pp. 117-130, 2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011, College Park, MD, United States, 11/14/11. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_11

Security games with market insurance. / Johnson, Benjamin; Böhme, Rainer; Grossklags, Jens.
Decision and Game Theory for Security - Second International Conference, GameSec 2011, Proceedings. 2011. p. 117-130 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7037 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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Security games with market insurance

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