TY - JOUR
T1 - Self-system in a model of cognition
AU - Ramamurthy, Uma
AU - Franklin, Stan
AU - Agrawal, Pulin
PY - 2012/12
Y1 - 2012/12
N2 - Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists have proposed various forms of a «self» in humans and animals. All of these selves seem to have a basis in some form of consciousness. The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) [Baars, 1988, 2003] suggests a mostly unconscious, many-layered self-system. In this paper, we consider several issues that arise from attempts to include a self-system in a software agent/cognitive robot. We explore these issues in the context of the LIDA model [Baars and Franklin, 2009; Ramamurthy et al., 2006] which implements the Global Workspace Theory.
AB - Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists have proposed various forms of a «self» in humans and animals. All of these selves seem to have a basis in some form of consciousness. The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) [Baars, 1988, 2003] suggests a mostly unconscious, many-layered self-system. In this paper, we consider several issues that arise from attempts to include a self-system in a software agent/cognitive robot. We explore these issues in the context of the LIDA model [Baars and Franklin, 2009; Ramamurthy et al., 2006] which implements the Global Workspace Theory.
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U2 - 10.1142/S1793843012400185
DO - 10.1142/S1793843012400185
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84872702516
SN - 1793-8430
VL - 4
SP - 325
EP - 333
JO - International Journal of Machine Consciousness
JF - International Journal of Machine Consciousness
IS - 2
ER -