Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default: Theory and Evidence

Brent W. Ambrose; Anthony B. Sanders; Abdullah Yavas

doi:10.1111/1540-6229.12099

Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default: Theory and Evidence

Brent W. Ambrose, Anthony B. Sanders, Abdullah Yavas

Risk Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study conflicting incentives of the master and special servicers in handling troubled loans in a Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities deal and how the frictions between the interests of the two servicers might be diminished if the master and special servicing rights are held by the same firm. We show that concentrating both servicing rights in one firm reduces the likelihood that a defaulted loan terminates in foreclosure.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	462-489
Number of pages	28
Journal	Real Estate Economics
Volume	44
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12099
State	Published - Jun 1 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Accounting
Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/1540-6229.12099

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author = "Ambrose, {Brent W.} and Sanders, {Anthony B.} and Abdullah Yavas",

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Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default: Theory and Evidence

Abstract

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