TY - JOUR
T1 - Shareholder litigation risk and real earnings management
T2 - a causal inference
AU - Liao, Qunfeng
AU - Ouyang, Bo
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited.
PY - 2019/11/28
Y1 - 2019/11/28
N2 - Purpose: The authors study how shareholder litigation risk impacts a firm’s decision of real earnings management (REM). This paper aims to shed light on how shareholder litigation risk impacts REM. The authors further explore how the intensifying effect varies systematically conditioning on the degree of information asymmetry and the strength of internal corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach: In this study, the authors use the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court ruling as a quasi-experiment that reduces shareholder litigation risk to address endogeneity and establish a causal inference. Findings: The difference-in-difference tests suggest lower shareholder litigation risk intensifies REM. In other words, higher litigation risk mitigates REM. Cross-sectional test results suggest the negative effect of decreased shareholder litigation is more pronounced when monitoring difficulty is higher, when information environment is more impoverished and when internal corporate governance is weaker. The negative effect is also stronger in firms with higher sensitivity to legal threats. Originality/value: Protection of investors’ interest is the focus of corporate governance. Designed as an important corporate governance mechanism, shareholder litigation enables investors to pursue legal actions to recover their losses in the event of corporate misbehaviors. However, whether shareholder litigation is an effective corporate governance tool and beneficial to shareholders and firms is not without controversy. The authors contribute to the debate by providing evidence that supports the argument that shareholder litigation threat significantly disciplines REM, a form of costlier earnings management technique and myopic investment behavior.
AB - Purpose: The authors study how shareholder litigation risk impacts a firm’s decision of real earnings management (REM). This paper aims to shed light on how shareholder litigation risk impacts REM. The authors further explore how the intensifying effect varies systematically conditioning on the degree of information asymmetry and the strength of internal corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach: In this study, the authors use the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court ruling as a quasi-experiment that reduces shareholder litigation risk to address endogeneity and establish a causal inference. Findings: The difference-in-difference tests suggest lower shareholder litigation risk intensifies REM. In other words, higher litigation risk mitigates REM. Cross-sectional test results suggest the negative effect of decreased shareholder litigation is more pronounced when monitoring difficulty is higher, when information environment is more impoverished and when internal corporate governance is weaker. The negative effect is also stronger in firms with higher sensitivity to legal threats. Originality/value: Protection of investors’ interest is the focus of corporate governance. Designed as an important corporate governance mechanism, shareholder litigation enables investors to pursue legal actions to recover their losses in the event of corporate misbehaviors. However, whether shareholder litigation is an effective corporate governance tool and beneficial to shareholders and firms is not without controversy. The authors contribute to the debate by providing evidence that supports the argument that shareholder litigation threat significantly disciplines REM, a form of costlier earnings management technique and myopic investment behavior.
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U2 - 10.1108/RAF-06-2018-0122
DO - 10.1108/RAF-06-2018-0122
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85074362252
SN - 1475-7702
VL - 18
SP - 557
EP - 588
JO - Review of Accounting and Finance
JF - Review of Accounting and Finance
IS - 4
ER -