Abstract
A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or “deliberating” before voting. Our main result is that if the committee plays its preferred equilibrium and the Principal uses a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation. We show using examples how she can gain if she can choose the equilibrium played by the committee, or use a non-anonymous or non-monotone voting rule.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 284-294 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 118 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Nov 2019 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics