Stability vs. no justified envy

Assaf Romm, Alvin E. Roth, Ran I. Shorrer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)357-366
Number of pages10
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume148
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2024

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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