Stable Nash equilibria of ALOHA medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior

George Kesidis; Youngmi Jin; Amar Prakash Azad; Eitan Altman

doi:10.1109/CDC.2010.5717121

Stable Nash equilibria of ALOHA medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior

George Kesidis, Youngmi Jin, Amar Prakash Azad, Eitan Altman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider the effects of altruistic behavior on random medium access control (slotted ALOHA) for local area communication networks. For an idealized, synchronously iterative, two-player game with asymmetric player demands, we find a Lyapunov function governing the "better-response" Jacobi dynamics under purely altruistic behavior. Though the positions of the interior Nash equilibrium points do not change in the presence of altruistic behavior, the nature of their local asymptotic stability does. There is a region of partially altruistic behavior for which both interior Nash equilibrium points are locally asymptotically stable. Variations of these altruistic game frameworks are discussed considering power (instead of throughput) based costs and linear utility functions.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	1071-1075
Number of pages	5
ISBN (Print)	9781424477456
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2010.5717121
State	Published - 2010
Event	49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010 - Atlanta, United States Duration: Dec 15 2010 → Dec 17 2010

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)	0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)	2576-2370

Conference

Conference	49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
Country/Territory	United States
City	Atlanta
Period	12/15/10 → 12/17/10

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Control and Systems Engineering
Modeling and Simulation
Control and Optimization

Access to Document

10.1109/CDC.2010.5717121

Cite this

Kesidis, G., Jin, Y., Azad, A. P., & Altman, E. (2010). Stable Nash equilibria of ALOHA medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior. In 2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010 (pp. 1071-1075). Article 5717121 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2010.5717121

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title = "Stable Nash equilibria of ALOHA medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior",

abstract = "We consider the effects of altruistic behavior on random medium access control (slotted ALOHA) for local area communication networks. For an idealized, synchronously iterative, two-player game with asymmetric player demands, we find a Lyapunov function governing the {"}better-response{"} Jacobi dynamics under purely altruistic behavior. Though the positions of the interior Nash equilibrium points do not change in the presence of altruistic behavior, the nature of their local asymptotic stability does. There is a region of partially altruistic behavior for which both interior Nash equilibrium points are locally asymptotically stable. Variations of these altruistic game frameworks are discussed considering power (instead of throughput) based costs and linear utility functions.",

author = "George Kesidis and Youngmi Jin and Azad, {Amar Prakash} and Eitan Altman",

year = "2010",

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language = "English (US)",

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pages = "1071--1075",

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note = "49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010 ; Conference date: 15-12-2010 Through 17-12-2010",

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Kesidis, G, Jin, Y, Azad, AP & Altman, E 2010, Stable Nash equilibria of ALOHA medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior. in 2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010., 5717121, Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1071-1075, 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010, Atlanta, United States, 12/15/10. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2010.5717121

Stable Nash equilibria of ALOHA medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior. / Kesidis, George; Jin, Youngmi; Azad, Amar Prakash et al.
2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2010. p. 1071-1075 5717121 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AB - We consider the effects of altruistic behavior on random medium access control (slotted ALOHA) for local area communication networks. For an idealized, synchronously iterative, two-player game with asymmetric player demands, we find a Lyapunov function governing the "better-response" Jacobi dynamics under purely altruistic behavior. Though the positions of the interior Nash equilibrium points do not change in the presence of altruistic behavior, the nature of their local asymptotic stability does. There is a region of partially altruistic behavior for which both interior Nash equilibrium points are locally asymptotically stable. Variations of these altruistic game frameworks are discussed considering power (instead of throughput) based costs and linear utility functions.

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Kesidis G, Jin Y, Azad AP, Altman E. Stable Nash equilibria of ALOHA medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior. In 2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2010. p. 1071-1075. 5717121. (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). doi: 10.1109/CDC.2010.5717121

Stable Nash equilibria of ALOHA medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior

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