Strategic reassurance in a proliferation-permissive orld: American and Russian options

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The character of the strategic nuclear relationship between Russia and the United States remains an important aspect of nuclear arms control and as a necessary backdrop for other issues. A permissive environment has been maintained for nuclear arms control between the two states. Nevertheless, the US and Russia need to maintain steel nerves and gyroscopic centrality on nuclear issues. The significance of strategic nuclear arms control between the two states increases as the threat of nuclear proliferation stalks the Middle East and Asia. The US and Russia have strong policy incentives to maintain nuclear deterrents that are "second to none" and essentially equivalent at various levels. US-Russian nuclear strategic stability is not a substitute for military strategy or operational art in the fighting of wars and campaigns. Command-control system performance is a time-urgent subject for the defense analytic and military communities. The ability of Washington or Moscow to reassure allies and friends against threats of nuclear coercion from rogue or revisionist states requires "extended deterrence" with a defensive component. The politics of US-Russian co-operative security and the dialogue of strategic reassurance are the building blocks for continued debellicism in Europe, nuclear containment outside of Europe and incorporation of Russia into the world of stable democracies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)221-239
Number of pages19
JournalDefense and Security Analysis
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2006

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Political Science and International Relations


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