TY - GEN
T1 - Strategic Remote Attestation
T2 - 12th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2021
AU - Roy, Shanto
AU - Kadir, Salah Uddin
AU - Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
AU - Laszka, Aron
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Internet of Things (IoT) devices and applications can have significant vulnerabilities, which may be exploited by adversaries to cause considerable harm. An important approach for mitigating this threat is remote attestation, which enables the defender to remotely verify the integrity of devices and their software. There are a number of approaches for remote attestation, and each has its unique advantages and disadvantages in terms of detection accuracy and computational cost. Further, an attestation method may be applied in multiple ways, such as various levels of software coverage. Therefore, to minimize both security risks and computational overhead, defenders need to decide strategically which attestation methods to apply and how to apply them, depending on the characteristic of the devices and the potential losses. To answer these questions, we first develop a testbed for remote attestation of IoT devices, which enables us to measure the detection accuracy and performance overhead of various attestation methods. Our testbed integrates two example IoT applications, memory-checksum based attestation, and a variety of software vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to inject arbitrary code into running applications. Second, we model the problem of finding an optimal strategy for applying remote attestation as a Stackelberg security game between a defender and an adversary. We characterize the defender’s optimal attestation strategy in a variety of special cases. Finally, building on experimental results from our testbed, we evaluate our model and show that optimal strategic attestation can lead to significantly lower losses than naïve baseline strategies.
AB - Internet of Things (IoT) devices and applications can have significant vulnerabilities, which may be exploited by adversaries to cause considerable harm. An important approach for mitigating this threat is remote attestation, which enables the defender to remotely verify the integrity of devices and their software. There are a number of approaches for remote attestation, and each has its unique advantages and disadvantages in terms of detection accuracy and computational cost. Further, an attestation method may be applied in multiple ways, such as various levels of software coverage. Therefore, to minimize both security risks and computational overhead, defenders need to decide strategically which attestation methods to apply and how to apply them, depending on the characteristic of the devices and the potential losses. To answer these questions, we first develop a testbed for remote attestation of IoT devices, which enables us to measure the detection accuracy and performance overhead of various attestation methods. Our testbed integrates two example IoT applications, memory-checksum based attestation, and a variety of software vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to inject arbitrary code into running applications. Second, we model the problem of finding an optimal strategy for applying remote attestation as a Stackelberg security game between a defender and an adversary. We characterize the defender’s optimal attestation strategy in a variety of special cases. Finally, building on experimental results from our testbed, we evaluate our model and show that optimal strategic attestation can lead to significantly lower losses than naïve baseline strategies.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_15
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_15
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85119366427
SN - 9783030903695
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 271
EP - 290
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security - 12th International Conference, GameSec 2021, Proceedings
A2 - Bošanský, Branislav
A2 - Gonzalez, Cleotilde
A2 - Rass, Stefan
A2 - Rass, Stefan
A2 - Sinha, Arunesh
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Y2 - 25 October 2021 through 27 October 2021
ER -