TY - JOUR
T1 - Structural reform litigation
T2 - Remedial bargaining and bureaucratic drift
AU - Bertelli, Anthony M.
AU - Feldmann, Sven E.
PY - 2006/4
Y1 - 2006/4
N2 - Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift. copyright
AB - Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift. copyright
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U2 - 10.1177/0951629806061859
DO - 10.1177/0951629806061859
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:33645034125
SN - 0951-6298
VL - 18
SP - 159
EP - 183
JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics
JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics
IS - 2
ER -