TY - GEN
T1 - Structured security testing in the smart grid
AU - McDaniel, Patrick
AU - McLaughlin, Stephan
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is revolutionizing electrical grids. Intelligent AMI smart meters report real time usage data that enables efficient energy generation and use. However, aggressive deployments often outpace security efforts: new devices from a dizzying array of vendors are being introduced into grids with limited understanding of the security problems they represent. In this paper we develop an archetypal attack tree approach to guide penetration testing across multiple-vendor implementations of a technology class. In this, we graft archetypal attack trees modeling broad adversary goals and attack vectors to vendor-specific concrete attack trees. Evaluators then use the grafted trees as a roadmap to penetration testing. Our experiments with multiple vendors generate real attack scenarios using vulnerabilities identified during directed penetration testing, e.g., manipulation of energy usage data, spoofing meters, and extracting sensitive data from internal registers. We provide a detailed example of one such attack as tested using our developed methodology.
AB - The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is revolutionizing electrical grids. Intelligent AMI smart meters report real time usage data that enables efficient energy generation and use. However, aggressive deployments often outpace security efforts: new devices from a dizzying array of vendors are being introduced into grids with limited understanding of the security problems they represent. In this paper we develop an archetypal attack tree approach to guide penetration testing across multiple-vendor implementations of a technology class. In this, we graft archetypal attack trees modeling broad adversary goals and attack vectors to vendor-specific concrete attack trees. Evaluators then use the grafted trees as a roadmap to penetration testing. Our experiments with multiple vendors generate real attack scenarios using vulnerabilities identified during directed penetration testing, e.g., manipulation of energy usage data, spoofing meters, and extracting sensitive data from internal registers. We provide a detailed example of one such attack as tested using our developed methodology.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84864137698&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/ISCCSP.2012.6217858
DO - 10.1109/ISCCSP.2012.6217858
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84864137698
SN - 9781467302760
T3 - 5th International Symposium on Communications Control and Signal Processing, ISCCSP 2012
BT - 5th International Symposium on Communications Control and Signal Processing, ISCCSP 2012
T2 - 5th International Symposium on Communications Control and Signal Processing, ISCCSP 2012
Y2 - 2 May 2012 through 4 May 2012
ER -