TY - JOUR
T1 - Sustainable Management of Remanufacturing in Dynamic Supply Chains
AU - Chung, Sung Hoon
AU - Weaver, Robert D.
AU - Jeon, Hyun Woo
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2020/9/1
Y1 - 2020/9/1
N2 - Closed-loop production systems encompass all processes for returning, remanufacturing, recycling, discarding, and repackaging products. These elements form the core of sustainable manufacturing by managing what otherwise would be waste to enable reuse and by controlling its associated pollution. This paper presents the general management model of sustainable remanufacturing within a dynamic closed-loop supply chain. Our specification encompasses agents positioned at key stages in the supply chain, e.g., manufacturers, retailers, and customers, and considers both profitability and environmental performance of their decentralized decisions. We cast the problem to allow for interdependence of agents through a Nash game. These salient features simultaneously render the mathematical model more realistic and computationally challenging. To proceed, our model is formalized by using variational inequalities, which in turn are converted to a fixed point problem that we solve using a computationally tractable algorithm. Decision rules for strategic remanufacturing and recycling are provided to complement the numerical solution in an illustrative example.
AB - Closed-loop production systems encompass all processes for returning, remanufacturing, recycling, discarding, and repackaging products. These elements form the core of sustainable manufacturing by managing what otherwise would be waste to enable reuse and by controlling its associated pollution. This paper presents the general management model of sustainable remanufacturing within a dynamic closed-loop supply chain. Our specification encompasses agents positioned at key stages in the supply chain, e.g., manufacturers, retailers, and customers, and considers both profitability and environmental performance of their decentralized decisions. We cast the problem to allow for interdependence of agents through a Nash game. These salient features simultaneously render the mathematical model more realistic and computationally challenging. To proceed, our model is formalized by using variational inequalities, which in turn are converted to a fixed point problem that we solve using a computationally tractable algorithm. Decision rules for strategic remanufacturing and recycling are provided to complement the numerical solution in an illustrative example.
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U2 - 10.1007/s11067-020-09493-7
DO - 10.1007/s11067-020-09493-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85082112493
SN - 1566-113X
VL - 20
SP - 703
EP - 731
JO - Networks and Spatial Economics
JF - Networks and Spatial Economics
IS - 3
ER -