TY - JOUR
T1 - The accidental transgressor
T2 - Morally-relevant theory of mind
AU - Killen, Melanie
AU - Lynn Mulvey, Kelly
AU - Richardson, Cameron
AU - Jampol, Noah
AU - Woodward, Amanda
N1 - Funding Information:
The first author was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (#BCS-0840492). We acknowledge the undergraduate research assistance from Elizabeth Blumenfeld, Samantha Cibelli, Betsy Cunnane, Mara Duvra, Laurie Eisenband, Wei Fan, Shawnese Gilpin, Sonia Giron, Phyllis Guthua, Riva Kantor, Stephanie Rivero, Erika Salomon, Dennis Tom-Wigfield, Jayne Trageser, Lisa Weinberg, and Erica Zippert. We thank the graduate students, Aline Hitti, Shelby Cooley, and Megan Clark Kelly, for their research assistance, and the students, parents, and teachers who participated in this study.
PY - 2011/5
Y1 - 2011/5
N2 - To test young children's false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N= 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5. years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an " accidental transgressor" task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N= 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.
AB - To test young children's false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N= 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5. years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an " accidental transgressor" task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N= 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.006
DO - 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.006
M3 - Article
C2 - 21377148
AN - SCOPUS:79952814257
SN - 0010-0277
VL - 119
SP - 197
EP - 215
JO - Cognition
JF - Cognition
IS - 2
ER -