TY - JOUR
T1 - The art of conversation
T2 - Eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
AU - Krishna, Vijay
AU - Morgan, John
N1 - Funding Information:
$We thank seminar participants at Games 2000, the Hoover Institution, the Institute for Advanced Study, UCLA, the University of Chicago and Washington University in St. Louis for helpful comments. This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support and hospitality of the Hoover Institution. ·Corresponding author. Fax: 810-885-5959. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (V. Krishna), [email protected] (J. Morgan).
PY - 2004/8
Y1 - 2004/8
N2 - We examine the strategic interaction between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker, extending the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50 (1982) 1431). We modify their model to allow for more extensive communication between the two parties and show that face-to-face communication between the expert and the uninformed decision maker followed by a written report from the expert leads to improved information transmission. In (almost) all cases, there exists an equilibrium in our modified model that ex ante Pareto dominates all of the equilibria identified by Crawford and Sobel. This remains true even if the expert's bias is so great that in their model no information would be disclosed.
AB - We examine the strategic interaction between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker, extending the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50 (1982) 1431). We modify their model to allow for more extensive communication between the two parties and show that face-to-face communication between the expert and the uninformed decision maker followed by a written report from the expert leads to improved information transmission. In (almost) all cases, there exists an equilibrium in our modified model that ex ante Pareto dominates all of the equilibria identified by Crawford and Sobel. This remains true even if the expert's bias is so great that in their model no information would be disclosed.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/3343013139
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=3343013139&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.008
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.008
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:3343013139
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 117
SP - 147
EP - 179
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -