Abstract
In this research we outline and evaluate a theory of the "calculus of concession": when and why presidential primary candidates exit the race. Our explanation builds on prior studies of candidate attrition that traditionally emphasize money. However, we focus additional attention on the role of the press and its potential to influence a candidate's exit decision. Data from the 2000 Republican presidential nomination campaign are used to test a Weibull model of candidate exit. Our results suggest that money is a critical component. But our research also demonstrates that the influence of money on candidates' decisions depends on the candidate's competitive position in the race. The availability of financial resources is far more critical to a close runner-up than to a less established long shot. Conversely, news coverage is far more critical to the decisions of long-shot candidates early in the campaign than it is to big-shot candidates later on.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 310-337 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | American Politics Research |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2004 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science
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In: American Politics Research, Vol. 32, No. 3, 05.2004, p. 310-337.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - The Calculus of Concession
T2 - Media Coverage and the Dynamics of Winnowing in Presidential Nominations
AU - Haynes, Audrey A.
AU - Gurian, Paul Henri
AU - Crespin, Michael H.
AU - Zorn, Christopher
N1 - Funding Information: Haynes Audrey A. Gurian Paul-Henri University of Georgia Crespin Michael H. Michigan State University Zorn Christopher National Science Foundation 05 2004 32 3 310 337 2004 In this research we outline and evaluate a theory of the “calculus of concession”: when and why presidential primary candidates exit the race. Our explanation builds on prior studies of candidate attrition that traditionally emphasize money. However, we focus additional attention on the role of the press and its potential to influence a candidate’s exit decision. Data from the 2000 Republican presidential nomination campaign are used to test a Weibull model of candidate exit. Our results suggest that money is a critical component. But our research also demonstrates that the influence of money on candidates’ decisions depends on the candidate’s competitive position in the race. The availability of financial resources is far more critical to a close runner-up than to a less established long shot. Conversely, news coverage is far more critical to the decisions of longshot candidates early in the campaign than it is to big-shot candidates later on. presidential nominations media coverage money competitive distance winnowing hwp-legacy-fpage 310 hwp-legacy-dochead Journal Article Abramowitz, A. I. ( 1989 ). Viability, electability, and candidate choice in a presidential primary election: A test of competing models. Journal of Politics , 51 , 977 -992. Abramson, P. R., Aldrich, J. H., & Rohde, D. W. ( 1987 ). Progressive ambition among United States senators, 1972-1988. Journal of Politics , 49 , 3 -35. Aldrich, J. H. ( 1980 ). Before the convention: Strategies and choices in presidential nomination campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Arterton, C. ( 1984 ). Media politics: The news strategies of presidential campaigns. Lexington, MA: Heath. Bartels, L. M. ( 1988 ). Presidential primaries and the dynamics of public choice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Box-Steffensmeier, J. M.,& Jones, B. S. ( 1997 ). Time is of the essence: Event history models in political science. American Journal of Political Science , 41 , 1414 -1461. Box-Steffensmeier, J. M.,& Zorn, C. ( 2001 ). Duration models and proportional hazards in political science. American Journal of Political Science , 45 , 951 -967. Brams, S. J. ( 1978 ). The presidential election game. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Damore, D. F. ( 1997 ). Adynamic model of candidate fundraising: The case of presidential nomination campaigns. Political Research Quarterly , 50 , 343 -364. Flowers, J. F., Haynes, A. A., & Crespin, M. ( 2003 ). The media, the campaign and the message. American Journal of Political Science , 47 , 259 -273. Gurian, P., Dunn, R., & Haynes, A. (1998, September). Targeting opponents: Strategy in presidential nominations. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. Haynes, A. A. (1996). National and local media coverage of the presidential nomination campaign of 1992 . Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus. Haynes, A. A.,& Flowers, J. F. ( 2002 ). News norms and the strategic timing and content of candidate messages. Journal of Political Marketing , 1 , 1 -21. Haynes, A. A., Flowers, J. F.,& Gurian, P. ( 2002 ). Getting the message out: Candidate communication strategy during the invisible primary. Political Research Quarterly , 55 , 633 -652. Haynes, A. A.,& Murray, S. ( 1998 ). Why do the news media cover certain candidates more than others? The antecedents of state and national news coverage in the 1992 presidential nomination campaign. American Politics Quarterly , 26 (4), 420 -438. Holbrook, T. M. ( 1994 ). Campaigns, national conditions, and U.S. presidential elections. American Journal of Political Science , 38 , 973 -998. Holbrook, T. M. ( 1996 ). Do campaigns matter?Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Just, M. R., Crigler, A. M., Alger, D. E., Cook, T. E., Kern, M.,& West, D. M. ( 1996 ). Crosstalk. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Keech, W.,& Matthews, D. R. ( 1976 ). The party’s choice. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. Lengle, J. I. ( 1981 ). Representation and presidential primaries. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Matthews, D. R. ( 1978 ). Winnowing. In J. D. Barber (Ed.), Race for the presidency(pp. 55 -78). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Mayer, W. G. ( 1996 ). The divided Democrats. Boulder, CO: Westview. Mutz, D. C. ( 1995 ). Effects of horse-race coverage on campaign coffers: Strategic contributing in presidential primaries. Journal of Politics , 57 , 1015 -1042. Norrander, B. ( 1996 ). Field essay: Presidential nomination politics in the post-reform era. Political Research Quarterly , 49 , 875 -915. Norrander, B. ( 2000 ). The end game in post-reform presidential nominations. Journal of Politics , 62 , 999 -1013. Patterson, T. E. ( 1988 ). The mass media election: How Americans choose their president. New York: Praeger. Patterson, T. E. ( 1993 ). Out of order. New York: Vintage. Robinson, M. S., & Sheehan, M. ( 1983 ). Over the wire and on TV. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Rohde, D. W. ( 1979 ). Risk-bearing and progressive ambition: The case ofmembers of the United States of America. American Journal of Political Science , 23 , 1 -26. Schlesinger, J. A. ( 1966 ). Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally. Schlesinger, J. A. ( 1975 ). The primary goals of political parties: Aclarification of positive theory. American Political Science Review , 69 , 840 -849. Seelye, K. Q. ( 1999, October 21 ). The Dole candidacy: The overview; low on cash, Dole withdraws from G.O.P. race. The New York Times, p. A1 -A1. Shaw, D. R. ( 1999 ). The impact of news media favorability and candidate events in presidential campaigns. Political Communication , 16 , 183 -197. Shaw, D. R., & Roberts, B. E. ( 2000 ). Campaign events, the media and the propsects of victory: The 1992 and 1996 U.S. presidential elections. British Journal of Political Science , 30 , 259 -289. Steger, W. P. (in press). Presidential re-nomination challenges in the 20th century. Presidential Studies Quarterly. Steger, W. P., Dowdle, A.,& Adkins, R. E. (2003, November). The New Hampshire effect: What function does the bellwether primary really perform in the outcome of presidential nominations? Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Steger, W. P., Hickman, J.,& Yohn, K. ( 2002 ). Candidate competition and attrition in presidential primaries, 1912 to 2000. American Politics Research , 30 , 528 -554. Stone, W. J., Rapoport, R.,& Atkeson, L. R. ( 1995 ). Asimulation model of presidential nomination choice. 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PY - 2004/5
Y1 - 2004/5
N2 - In this research we outline and evaluate a theory of the "calculus of concession": when and why presidential primary candidates exit the race. Our explanation builds on prior studies of candidate attrition that traditionally emphasize money. However, we focus additional attention on the role of the press and its potential to influence a candidate's exit decision. Data from the 2000 Republican presidential nomination campaign are used to test a Weibull model of candidate exit. Our results suggest that money is a critical component. But our research also demonstrates that the influence of money on candidates' decisions depends on the candidate's competitive position in the race. The availability of financial resources is far more critical to a close runner-up than to a less established long shot. Conversely, news coverage is far more critical to the decisions of long-shot candidates early in the campaign than it is to big-shot candidates later on.
AB - In this research we outline and evaluate a theory of the "calculus of concession": when and why presidential primary candidates exit the race. Our explanation builds on prior studies of candidate attrition that traditionally emphasize money. However, we focus additional attention on the role of the press and its potential to influence a candidate's exit decision. Data from the 2000 Republican presidential nomination campaign are used to test a Weibull model of candidate exit. Our results suggest that money is a critical component. But our research also demonstrates that the influence of money on candidates' decisions depends on the candidate's competitive position in the race. The availability of financial resources is far more critical to a close runner-up than to a less established long shot. Conversely, news coverage is far more critical to the decisions of long-shot candidates early in the campaign than it is to big-shot candidates later on.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=2142662863&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/1532673X03260353
DO - 10.1177/1532673X03260353
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:2142662863
SN - 1532-673X
VL - 32
SP - 310
EP - 337
JO - American Politics Research
JF - American Politics Research
IS - 3
ER -