The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely

J. S. Jordan

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90088-6

The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely

J. S. Jordan

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

71 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper establishes that the competitive allocation process is the only informationally decentralized mechanism for exchange environments which (i) achieves Pareto optimal allocations; (ii) gives each consumer an allocation which is, according to his preferences, at least as good as his endowment; (iii) satisfies certain regularity conditions; and (iv) has a message space of the smallest dimension necessary to satisfy (i-iii).

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1-18
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	28
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90088-6
State	Published - Oct 1982

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0022-0531(82)90088-6

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title = "The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely",

abstract = "This paper establishes that the competitive allocation process is the only informationally decentralized mechanism for exchange environments which (i) achieves Pareto optimal allocations; (ii) gives each consumer an allocation which is, according to his preferences, at least as good as his endowment; (iii) satisfies certain regularity conditions; and (iv) has a message space of the smallest dimension necessary to satisfy (i-iii).",

author = "Jordan, \{J. S.\}",

note = "Funding Information: * I would like to thank Professors L. Hurwicz and S. Reiter for stimulating This research was supported by NSF Grant SOC 77-07852. Any remaining own.",

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PY - 1982/10

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N2 - This paper establishes that the competitive allocation process is the only informationally decentralized mechanism for exchange environments which (i) achieves Pareto optimal allocations; (ii) gives each consumer an allocation which is, according to his preferences, at least as good as his endowment; (iii) satisfies certain regularity conditions; and (iv) has a message space of the smallest dimension necessary to satisfy (i-iii).

AB - This paper establishes that the competitive allocation process is the only informationally decentralized mechanism for exchange environments which (i) achieves Pareto optimal allocations; (ii) gives each consumer an allocation which is, according to his preferences, at least as good as his endowment; (iii) satisfies certain regularity conditions; and (iv) has a message space of the smallest dimension necessary to satisfy (i-iii).

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The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely

Abstract

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