TY - JOUR
T1 - The cost of callousness
T2 - Regulating compassion influences the moral self-concept
AU - Cameron, C. Daryl
AU - Payne, B. Keith
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship awarded to C. Daryl Cameron.
PY - 2012/3
Y1 - 2012/3
N2 - It has often been argued that compassion is fundamental to morality. Yet people often suppress compassion for self-interested reasons. We provide evidence that suppressing compassion is not cost free, as it creates dissonance between a person's moral identity and his or her moral principles. We instructed separate groups of participants to regulate their compassion, regulate their feelings of distress, or freely experience emotions toward compassion-inducing images. Participants then reported how central morality was to their identities and how much they believed that moral rules should always be followed. Participants who regulated compassion-but not those who regulated distress or experienced emotions-showed a dissonance-based trade-off. If they reported higher levels of moral identity, they had a greater belief that moral rules could be broken. If they maintained their belief that moral rules should always be followed, they sacrificed their moral identity. Regulating compassion thus has a cost of its own: It forces trade-offs within a person's moral self-concept.
AB - It has often been argued that compassion is fundamental to morality. Yet people often suppress compassion for self-interested reasons. We provide evidence that suppressing compassion is not cost free, as it creates dissonance between a person's moral identity and his or her moral principles. We instructed separate groups of participants to regulate their compassion, regulate their feelings of distress, or freely experience emotions toward compassion-inducing images. Participants then reported how central morality was to their identities and how much they believed that moral rules should always be followed. Participants who regulated compassion-but not those who regulated distress or experienced emotions-showed a dissonance-based trade-off. If they reported higher levels of moral identity, they had a greater belief that moral rules could be broken. If they maintained their belief that moral rules should always be followed, they sacrificed their moral identity. Regulating compassion thus has a cost of its own: It forces trade-offs within a person's moral self-concept.
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U2 - 10.1177/0956797611430334
DO - 10.1177/0956797611430334
M3 - Article
C2 - 22368154
AN - SCOPUS:84858268326
SN - 0956-7976
VL - 23
SP - 225
EP - 229
JO - Psychological Science
JF - Psychological Science
IS - 3
ER -