TY - JOUR
T1 - The Economics of a Secondary Market for Variable Annuities
AU - Moenig, Thorsten
AU - Zhu, Nan
N1 - Funding Information:
This work is sponsored by the Society of Actuaries’ Committee on Knowledge Extension Research (CKER) through its 2018 Individual Research Grant. We thank two anonymous referees and the editor Patrick Brockett, whose feedback helped improve this article significantly. In addition, we are indebted to Jim Kosinski, Tim Luedtke, an anonymous CPA, and an anonymous tax attorney for their insights on the practical aspects and the taxation of secondary variable annuity transfers. We also thank Daniel Bauer, Cameron Ellis, Jochen Russ, as well as seminar participants at the 2018 ARIA annual meeting, the 53rd Actuarial Research Conference, and Temple University for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Society of Actuaries.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - This article demonstrates that a secondary market for U.S. variable annuity policies may be immediately welfare enhancing to all parties involved: the insurer, the original policyholder, and a third-party investor. Our model reflects relevant market frictions—here, the product’s tax benefits—that produce differing valuation perspectives for the three parties. This allows for policy transfers that benefit all parties simultaneously, including the insurance company, irrespective of the level of control that it exerts over this secondary market. We illustrate our insights first with a theoretical two-period model, followed by an empirically motivated numerical analysis. Our numerical results suggest a best-estimate total welfare gain of 2.6% of the initial investment amount under the optimal secondary market structure.
AB - This article demonstrates that a secondary market for U.S. variable annuity policies may be immediately welfare enhancing to all parties involved: the insurer, the original policyholder, and a third-party investor. Our model reflects relevant market frictions—here, the product’s tax benefits—that produce differing valuation perspectives for the three parties. This allows for policy transfers that benefit all parties simultaneously, including the insurance company, irrespective of the level of control that it exerts over this secondary market. We illustrate our insights first with a theoretical two-period model, followed by an empirically motivated numerical analysis. Our numerical results suggest a best-estimate total welfare gain of 2.6% of the initial investment amount under the optimal secondary market structure.
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U2 - 10.1080/10920277.2020.1802598
DO - 10.1080/10920277.2020.1802598
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85095739705
SN - 1092-0277
VL - 25
SP - 604
EP - 630
JO - North American Actuarial Journal
JF - North American Actuarial Journal
IS - 4
ER -