TY - JOUR
T1 - The effect of perspective-taking on reasoning about strong and weak belief-relevant arguments
AU - McCrudden, Matthew T.
AU - Barnes, Ashleigh
AU - McTigue, Erin M.
AU - Welch, Casey
AU - MacDonald, Eilidh
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2017/4/3
Y1 - 2017/4/3
N2 - This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates (n = 93) read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency (i.e., belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent) and strength (i.e., strong or weak) about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from their own perspectives. Perspective-taking eliminated belief bias for weak arguments, but not for strong arguments. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed, and directions for future research are provided.
AB - This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates (n = 93) read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency (i.e., belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent) and strength (i.e., strong or weak) about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from their own perspectives. Perspective-taking eliminated belief bias for weak arguments, but not for strong arguments. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed, and directions for future research are provided.
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U2 - 10.1080/13546783.2016.1234411
DO - 10.1080/13546783.2016.1234411
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84989223432
SN - 1354-6783
VL - 23
SP - 115
EP - 133
JO - Thinking and Reasoning
JF - Thinking and Reasoning
IS - 2
ER -