Abstract
We investigate the impact of regulation on anti-takeover defenses for a large sample of U.S firms. We document that financial firms deploy significantly fewer anti-takeover defense mechanisms than do industrial firms. On the contrary, utility firms employ just as many defense mechanisms as industrial firms. Although both financial and utility firms are regulated, it appears that the effects of their regulations on takeover defenses are dissimilar.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 205-212 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | European Journal of Scientific Research |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| State | Published - Jul 2012 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Computer Science
- General Mathematics
- General Materials Science
- General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
- General Engineering
- General Earth and Planetary Sciences