Abstract
As a result of a public-interest lawsuit, by Court order we were able to study, for one month, the hardware and source code of the Sequoia AVC Advantage direct-recording electronic voting machine, which is used throughout New Jersey (and Louisiana), and the Court has permitted us to publicly describe almost everything that we were able to learn. In short, these machines are vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks on the voting process. It would not be in the slightest difficult for a moderately determined group or individual to mount a vote-stealing attack that would be successful and undetectable.
Original language | English (US) |
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State | Published - 2009 |
Event | 2009 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, EVT/WOTE 2009, Held in Conjunction with the 18th USENIX Security Symposium - Montreal, Canada Duration: Aug 10 2009 → Aug 11 2009 |
Conference
Conference | 2009 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, EVT/WOTE 2009, Held in Conjunction with the 18th USENIX Security Symposium |
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Country/Territory | Canada |
City | Montreal |
Period | 8/10/09 → 8/11/09 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Science Applications
- Human-Computer Interaction
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Public Administration