TY - JOUR
T1 - The Perils of Laundering Control through Customers
T2 - A Study of Control and Resistance in the Ride-hail Industry
AU - Maffie, Michael David
N1 - Funding Information:
The data collection efforts for this article were supported by a research grant from Cornell University’s ILR School.
Funding Information:
The author gratefully acknowledges the feedback and insights provided by Alexander Colvin, David Lipsky, and Rachel Aleks. Additionally, I am indebted to J. Ryan Lamare and Ariel Avgar for their advice and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. Furthermore, this project would have not been possible without the generous support of Martin and Laurie Scheinman and the Scheinman Institute at Cornell University. Finally, I would like to thank Harry Campbell for his assistance with this project.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2020.
PY - 2022/3
Y1 - 2022/3
N2 - Customer abuse of frontline service workers is widespread. Yet despite growing recognition of this problem, we know very little about the role that service companies play in potentially enabling customers’ abusive behaviors. This phenomenon deserves attention because one of the recent trends in service management is giving customers a direct role in managing and evaluating workers’ performance. In this article, the author explores how granting customers direct access to organizational power over workers, what the author develops conceptually as “laundering control through customers,” explains how customer abuse emerges. Drawing on a sample of 486 Uber and Lyft drivers, the author examines how the companies’ use of the “five-star” evaluation system enables customers to engage in a range of different forms of abuse and how workers resist this configuration of control. This study contributes to the customer triangle literature by bringing in evidence from the gig economy and uncovers new implications for the “dark side” of customer service work.
AB - Customer abuse of frontline service workers is widespread. Yet despite growing recognition of this problem, we know very little about the role that service companies play in potentially enabling customers’ abusive behaviors. This phenomenon deserves attention because one of the recent trends in service management is giving customers a direct role in managing and evaluating workers’ performance. In this article, the author explores how granting customers direct access to organizational power over workers, what the author develops conceptually as “laundering control through customers,” explains how customer abuse emerges. Drawing on a sample of 486 Uber and Lyft drivers, the author examines how the companies’ use of the “five-star” evaluation system enables customers to engage in a range of different forms of abuse and how workers resist this configuration of control. This study contributes to the customer triangle literature by bringing in evidence from the gig economy and uncovers new implications for the “dark side” of customer service work.
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U2 - 10.1177/0019793920972679
DO - 10.1177/0019793920972679
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85097288004
SN - 0019-7939
VL - 75
SP - 348
EP - 372
JO - ILR Review
JF - ILR Review
IS - 2
ER -