The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking

S. Nageeb Ali; Maximilian Mihm; Lucas Siga

doi:10.3982/ECTA22474

The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking

S. Nageeb Ali, Maximilian Mihm, Lucas Siga

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero-sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information. Our analysis identifies and interprets a form of “adverse correlation” that is necessary and sufficient for zero-sum thinking to prevail in equilibrium.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	41-70
Number of pages	30
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	93
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22474
State	Published - Jan 2025

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.3982/ECTA22474

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The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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