TY - JOUR
T1 - The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
AU - Andolfatto, David
AU - Nosal, Ed
AU - Wallace, Neil
PY - 2007/11
Y1 - 2007/11
N2 - Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences-and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.
AB - Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences-and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.11.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.11.004
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:36049040703
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 137
SP - 709
EP - 715
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -