Abstract
We analyze 114 NYSE- or AMEX-listed corporations with majority shareholders. Majority shareholders are approximately equally divided between corporations and individuals and are typically both directors and officers. When majority blocks trade, stock prices increase and there is substantial management turnover. Although majority shareholders are typically paid larger salaries than officers in diffusely held firms, the difference is small and of marginal significance. Investment policies, the frequency of corporate-control transactions, accounting return, and Tobin's Q are similar for majority-owned and diffusely held firms. Differences in these dimensions do emerge, however, between firms with corporate and individual majority shareholders.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 317-346 |
Number of pages | 30 |
Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
Volume | 20 |
Issue number | C |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1988 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management