TY - GEN
T1 - The semantic communication game
AU - Guler, Basak
AU - Yener, Aylin
AU - Swami, Ananthram
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 IEEE.
PY - 2016/7/12
Y1 - 2016/7/12
N2 - We study how to communicate semantic information in the presence of an agent that can influence the decoder by providing side information. The agent's true intentions, which may be adversarial or helpful, is unknown to the communicating parties. Actions taken by the agent are governed by its intentions, and they may improve or deteriorate the communication performance. We characterize the optimal transmission policies to minimize the end-to-end average semantic error, i.e., difference between the meanings of intended and recovered messages, under the uncertainty in the agent's true intentions. We formulate the semantic communication problem as a Bayesian game, and investigate the conditions under which a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists. We then explore the structure of the encoding and decoding functions under the mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which for the semantic communication problem at hand always exists. Our results show that the optimal policies are strongly influenced by the belief the parties hold about the agent's true intention.
AB - We study how to communicate semantic information in the presence of an agent that can influence the decoder by providing side information. The agent's true intentions, which may be adversarial or helpful, is unknown to the communicating parties. Actions taken by the agent are governed by its intentions, and they may improve or deteriorate the communication performance. We characterize the optimal transmission policies to minimize the end-to-end average semantic error, i.e., difference between the meanings of intended and recovered messages, under the uncertainty in the agent's true intentions. We formulate the semantic communication problem as a Bayesian game, and investigate the conditions under which a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists. We then explore the structure of the encoding and decoding functions under the mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which for the semantic communication problem at hand always exists. Our results show that the optimal policies are strongly influenced by the belief the parties hold about the agent's true intention.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84981334704&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84981334704&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICC.2016.7510797
DO - 10.1109/ICC.2016.7510797
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84981334704
T3 - 2016 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2016
BT - 2016 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2016
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2016 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2016
Y2 - 22 May 2016 through 27 May 2016
ER -