Abstract
It is widely accepted by philosophers of well-being that the shape or narrative structure of a life is a significant determinant of its overall welfare value. Most arguments for this thesis posit agent-independent value in certain life shapes. The desire theory of well-being, I argue, has all of the resources needed to account for the value that many philosophers have identified in lives with certain shapes. The theory denies that there is any agent-independent value in shapes and, indeed, allows that there can be both agent-dependent value and agent-dependent disvalue in the shapes commonly claimed to hold agent-independent value.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 661-680 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 100 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 2019 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy