Time-optimized and truthful dynamic spectrum rental mechanism

Shabnam Sodagari, Alireza Attar, Victor C M Leung, Sven G. Bilen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Scopus citations


The process of admitting secondary spectrum users via spectrum auctions provides a convenient framework for the primary license holder to control utilization of its idle resources. While most existing solutions in the literature are static, offline auction mechanisms, the dynamics of arrival and departure of secondary bidders, as well as the uncertainty of availability of a given sub-channel for leasing in future, calls for novel auction strategies. In this paper we propose a dynamic, online auction design that addresses two key issues. First, we determine optimal auction instances so as to maximize the profitability of this auction model. Further, by utilizing critical pricing strategy, the incentive of bidding secondaries to misreport their price, time of arrival, and departure is alleviated and hence a truthful, profitable auction results. Our numerical results verify the profitability of this dynamic auction as compared with static Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions with fixed auction time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Proceedings
StatePublished - 2010
Event2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Ottawa, ON, Canada
Duration: Sep 6 2010Sep 9 2010

Publication series

NameIEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
ISSN (Print)1550-2252


Other2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall
CityOttawa, ON

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Applied Mathematics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Science Applications


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