TY - GEN
T1 - Time-optimized and truthful dynamic spectrum rental mechanism
AU - Sodagari, Shabnam
AU - Attar, Alireza
AU - Leung, Victor C M
AU - Bilen, Sven G.
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - The process of admitting secondary spectrum users via spectrum auctions provides a convenient framework for the primary license holder to control utilization of its idle resources. While most existing solutions in the literature are static, offline auction mechanisms, the dynamics of arrival and departure of secondary bidders, as well as the uncertainty of availability of a given sub-channel for leasing in future, calls for novel auction strategies. In this paper we propose a dynamic, online auction design that addresses two key issues. First, we determine optimal auction instances so as to maximize the profitability of this auction model. Further, by utilizing critical pricing strategy, the incentive of bidding secondaries to misreport their price, time of arrival, and departure is alleviated and hence a truthful, profitable auction results. Our numerical results verify the profitability of this dynamic auction as compared with static Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions with fixed auction time.
AB - The process of admitting secondary spectrum users via spectrum auctions provides a convenient framework for the primary license holder to control utilization of its idle resources. While most existing solutions in the literature are static, offline auction mechanisms, the dynamics of arrival and departure of secondary bidders, as well as the uncertainty of availability of a given sub-channel for leasing in future, calls for novel auction strategies. In this paper we propose a dynamic, online auction design that addresses two key issues. First, we determine optimal auction instances so as to maximize the profitability of this auction model. Further, by utilizing critical pricing strategy, the incentive of bidding secondaries to misreport their price, time of arrival, and departure is alleviated and hence a truthful, profitable auction results. Our numerical results verify the profitability of this dynamic auction as compared with static Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions with fixed auction time.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78649405580&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=78649405580&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/VETECF.2010.5594298
DO - 10.1109/VETECF.2010.5594298
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:78649405580
SN - 9781424435746
T3 - IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
BT - 2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall - Proceedings
T2 - 2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference Fall, VTC2010-Fall
Y2 - 6 September 2010 through 9 September 2010
ER -