TY - GEN
T1 - Too good to be safe
T2 - 30th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2021
AU - Jing, Pengfei
AU - Tang, Qiyi
AU - Du, Yuefeng
AU - Xue, Lei
AU - Luo, Xiapu
AU - Wang, Ting
AU - Nie, Sen
AU - Wu, Shi
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank our shepherd Yongdae Kim and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. We thank Prof. Yubin Xia for helping us in conducting experiments. This work is partly supported by Hong Kong RGC Projects (No. 152239/18E), Hong Kong ITF Project (No. ITS/197/17FP), HKPolyU Research Grant (ZVQ8), Start-up Fund (ZVU7), NSFC for Young Scientists of China (No. 62002306), and CCF-Tencent Open Research Fund. Ting Wang was partly supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1953893, 1953813, and 1951729.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 by The USENIX Association. All rights reserved.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Autonomous driving is developing rapidly and has achieved promising performance by adopting machine learning algorithms to finish various tasks automatically. Lane detection is one of the major tasks because its result directly affects the steering decisions. Although recent studies have discovered some vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles, to the best of our knowledge, none has investigated the security of lane detection module in real vehicles. In this paper, we conduct the first investigation on the lane detection module in a real vehicle, and reveal that the over-sensitivity of the target module can be exploited to launch attacks on the vehicle. More precisely, an over-sensitive lane detection module may regard small markings on the road surface, which are introduced by an adversary, as a valid lane and then drive the vehicle in the wrong direction. It is challenging to design such small road markings that should be perceived by the lane detection module but unnoticeable to the driver. Manual manipulation of the road markings to launch attacks on the lane detection module is very labor-intensive and error-prone. We propose a novel two-stage approach to automatically determine such road markings after tackling several technical challenges. Our approach first decides the optimal perturbations on the camera image and then maps them to road markings in physical world. We conduct extensive experiments on a Tesla Model S vehicle, and the experimental results show that the lane detection module can be deceived by very unobtrusive perturbations to create a lane, thus misleading the vehicle in auto-steer mode.
AB - Autonomous driving is developing rapidly and has achieved promising performance by adopting machine learning algorithms to finish various tasks automatically. Lane detection is one of the major tasks because its result directly affects the steering decisions. Although recent studies have discovered some vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles, to the best of our knowledge, none has investigated the security of lane detection module in real vehicles. In this paper, we conduct the first investigation on the lane detection module in a real vehicle, and reveal that the over-sensitivity of the target module can be exploited to launch attacks on the vehicle. More precisely, an over-sensitive lane detection module may regard small markings on the road surface, which are introduced by an adversary, as a valid lane and then drive the vehicle in the wrong direction. It is challenging to design such small road markings that should be perceived by the lane detection module but unnoticeable to the driver. Manual manipulation of the road markings to launch attacks on the lane detection module is very labor-intensive and error-prone. We propose a novel two-stage approach to automatically determine such road markings after tackling several technical challenges. Our approach first decides the optimal perturbations on the camera image and then maps them to road markings in physical world. We conduct extensive experiments on a Tesla Model S vehicle, and the experimental results show that the lane detection module can be deceived by very unobtrusive perturbations to create a lane, thus misleading the vehicle in auto-steer mode.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85111197011
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85111197011#tab=citedBy
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85111197011
T3 - Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium
SP - 3237
EP - 3254
BT - Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium
PB - USENIX Association
Y2 - 11 August 2021 through 13 August 2021
ER -