TY - GEN
T1 - TrafficAdaptor
T2 - 30th ACM SIGSPATIAL International Conference on Advances in Geographic Information Systems, SIGSPATIAL GIS 2022
AU - Qiu, Chenxi
AU - Yan, Li
AU - Squicciarini, Anna
AU - Zhao, Juanjuan
AU - Xu, Chengzhong
AU - Pappachan, Primal
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 ACM.
PY - 2022/11/1
Y1 - 2022/11/1
N2 - One of the most popular location privacy-preserving mechanisms applied in location-based services (LBS) is location obfuscation, where mobile users are allowed to report obfuscated locations instead of their real locations to services. Many existing obfuscation approaches consider mobile users that can move freely over a region. However, this is inadequate for protecting the location privacy of vehicles, as their mobility is restricted by external factors, such as road networks and traffic flows. This auxiliary information about external factors helps an attacker to shrink the search range of vehicles' locations, increasing the risk of location exposure. In this paper, we propose a vehicle traffic flow aware attack that leverages public traffic flow information to recover a vehicle's real location from obfuscated location. As a countermeasure, we then develop an adaptive strategy to obfuscate a vehicle's location by a "fake"trajectory that follows a realistic traffic flow. The fake trajectory is designed to not only hide the vehicle's real location but also guarantee the quality of service (QoS) of LBS. Our experimental results demonstrate that 1) the new threat model can accurately track vehicles' real locations, which have been obfuscated by two state-of-the-art algorithms, and 2) the proposed obfuscation method can effectively protect vehicles' location privacy under the new threat model without compromising QoS.
AB - One of the most popular location privacy-preserving mechanisms applied in location-based services (LBS) is location obfuscation, where mobile users are allowed to report obfuscated locations instead of their real locations to services. Many existing obfuscation approaches consider mobile users that can move freely over a region. However, this is inadequate for protecting the location privacy of vehicles, as their mobility is restricted by external factors, such as road networks and traffic flows. This auxiliary information about external factors helps an attacker to shrink the search range of vehicles' locations, increasing the risk of location exposure. In this paper, we propose a vehicle traffic flow aware attack that leverages public traffic flow information to recover a vehicle's real location from obfuscated location. As a countermeasure, we then develop an adaptive strategy to obfuscate a vehicle's location by a "fake"trajectory that follows a realistic traffic flow. The fake trajectory is designed to not only hide the vehicle's real location but also guarantee the quality of service (QoS) of LBS. Our experimental results demonstrate that 1) the new threat model can accurately track vehicles' real locations, which have been obfuscated by two state-of-the-art algorithms, and 2) the proposed obfuscation method can effectively protect vehicles' location privacy under the new threat model without compromising QoS.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85142366113&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85142366113&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3557915.3560938
DO - 10.1145/3557915.3560938
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85142366113
T3 - GIS: Proceedings of the ACM International Symposium on Advances in Geographic Information Systems
BT - 30th ACM SIGSPATIAL International Conference on Advances in Geographic Information Systems, ACM SIGSPATIAL GIS 2022
A2 - Renz, Matthias
A2 - Sarwat, Mohamed
A2 - Nascimento, Mario A.
A2 - Shekhar, Shashi
A2 - Xie, Xing
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 1 November 2022 through 4 November 2022
ER -