Abstract
This paper considers the present condition and future prospects for post-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (post-START) nuclear arms reductions in the following sequence. First, we review the essential features of the agreement between Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in July 2009, for a START follow-on agreement. Second, we discuss the larger political and military-strategic contexts within which these post-START negotiations will play out. Third, we perform an analysis to determine whether the START follow-on guidelines would meet prospective requirements for mutual deterrence and, in addition, whether US–Russian reductions could safely go even lower. Fourth, we take a specific look at the estimated impact of defenses on deterrence stability under post-START reductions. Fifth, pertinent conclusions are summarized.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 201-225 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | European Security |
Volume | 18 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2009 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Political Science and International Relations