Abstract
The United States and Russia have options for resuming their strategic nuclear arms reductions, should more favorable political circumstances present themselves. Both share a responsibility for leadership in the global nonproliferation regime, and both the U.S. and Russia will face future trade-offs between domestic economic priorities and nuclear force modernization. Analysis suggests that reductions to a maximum number of 1,000 deployed nuclear weapons on intercontinental launchers for each state should allow for sufficient numbers of second-strike-survivable weapons for stable deterrence. Below that number, either the U.S. or Russia might feel a sense of insufficient flexibility and resilience in its strategic nuclear forces, and in addition, reductions significantly below 1,000 deployed weapons would require the participation of other nuclear weapons states.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 469-478 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Comparative Strategy |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 20 2015 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Political Science and International Relations