TY - JOUR
T1 - Turtle hunting and tombstone opening
T2 - Public generosity as costly signaling
AU - Smith, Eric Alden
AU - Bliege Bird, Rebecca L.
N1 - Funding Information:
Douglas Bird played a central role in formulating and conducting the Meriam research on which much of this paper is based. We are grateful to Nick Blurton Jones, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Pete Richerson, Rich Sosis, and Bruce Winterhalder for useful criticisms of earlier versions of this manuscript, and to Eldridge Adams, Doug Bird, Jim Boone, Rob Boyd, Kristen Hawkes, Randy Nesse, Alan Rogers, and Polly Wiessner for helpful discussions. Our immense thanks to the Meriam people for allowing us to learn from them. Supported by NSF grant SBR96-16096.
PY - 2000/7
Y1 - 2000/7
N2 - Costly signaling theory (CST) offers an explanation of generosity and collective action that contrasts sharply with explanations based on conditional reciprocity. This makes it particularly relevant to situations involving widespread unconditional provisioning of collective goods. We provide a preliminary application of CST to ethnographic data on turtle hunting and public feasting among the Meriam of Torres Strait, Australia. Turtle hunting appears to meet the key conditions specified in CST: it is (1) an honest signal of underlying abilities such as strength, risk-taking, skill, and leadership; (2) costly in ways not subject to reciprocation; (3) an effective means of broadcasting signals, since the collective good (a feast) attracts a large audience; and (4) seems to provide benefits to signalers (turtle hunters) as well as recipients (audience). We conclude with some suggestions as to the broader implications of this research, and the costly signaling paradigm in general, for understanding collective action and generosity in human social groups.
AB - Costly signaling theory (CST) offers an explanation of generosity and collective action that contrasts sharply with explanations based on conditional reciprocity. This makes it particularly relevant to situations involving widespread unconditional provisioning of collective goods. We provide a preliminary application of CST to ethnographic data on turtle hunting and public feasting among the Meriam of Torres Strait, Australia. Turtle hunting appears to meet the key conditions specified in CST: it is (1) an honest signal of underlying abilities such as strength, risk-taking, skill, and leadership; (2) costly in ways not subject to reciprocation; (3) an effective means of broadcasting signals, since the collective good (a feast) attracts a large audience; and (4) seems to provide benefits to signalers (turtle hunters) as well as recipients (audience). We conclude with some suggestions as to the broader implications of this research, and the costly signaling paradigm in general, for understanding collective action and generosity in human social groups.
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U2 - 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00031-3
DO - 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00031-3
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0034216104
SN - 1090-5138
VL - 21
SP - 245
EP - 261
JO - Evolution and Human Behavior
JF - Evolution and Human Behavior
IS - 4
ER -