Uncertainty in interdependent security games

Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags, Nicolas Christin, John Chuang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

31 Scopus citations


Even the most well-motivated models of information security have application limitations due to the inherent uncertainties involving risk. This paper exemplifies a formal mechanism for resolving this kind of uncertainty in interdependent security (IDS) scenarios. We focus on a single IDS model involving a computer network, and adapt the model to capture a notion that players have only a very rough idea of security threats and underlying structural ramifications. We formally resolve uncertainty by means of a probability distribution on risk parameters that is common knowledge to all players. To illustrate how this approach might yield fruitful applications, we postulate a well-motivated distribution, compute Bayesian Nash equilibria and tipping conditions for the derived model, and compare these with the analogous conditions for the original IDS model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - First International Conference, GameSec 2010, Proceedings
Number of pages11
StatePublished - 2010
Event1st International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2010 - Berlin, Germany
Duration: Nov 22 2010Nov 23 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6442 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Other1st International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2010

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science


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