Variable split awards in a single-stage procurement model

Dorothy E. Klotz, Kalyan Chatterjee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations


We show that splitting an award can result in lower expected procurement costs, even in a one-time procurement setting, as long as entering the bidding competition is costly. For sufficiently risk-averse bidders, the split award mechanism provides additional insurance against the possiblity of losing the bid and, therefore, any bidding costs. This result contrasts with previous theoretical works which focus on one-time procurement and have concluded that multiple sourcing increases expected procurement costs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)295-310
Number of pages16
JournalGroup Decision and Negotiation
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jul 1995

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Decision Sciences
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • General Social Sciences
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation


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