TY - GEN
T1 - VIMU
T2 - 40th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2024
AU - Wang, Yunbo
AU - Sun, Cong
AU - Liu, Qiaosen
AU - Su, Bingnan
AU - Zhang, Zongxu
AU - Norris, Michael
AU - Tan, Gang
AU - Ma, Jianfeng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 IEEE.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Sensor attacks on robotic vehicles have become pervasive and manipulative. Their latest advancements exploit sensor and detector characteristics to bypass detection. Recent security efforts have leveraged the physics-based model to detect or mitigate sensor attacks. However, these approaches are only resilient to a few sensor attacks and still need improvement in detection effectiveness. We present VIMU, an efficient sensor attack detection and resilience system for unmanned aerial vehicles. We propose a detection algorithm, CS-EMA, that leverages low-pass filtering to identify stealthy gyroscope attacks while achieving an overall effective sensor attack detection. We develop a fine-grained nonlinear physical model with precise aerodynamic and propulsion wrench modeling. We also augment the state estimation with a FIFO buffer safeguard to mitigate the impact of high-rate IMU attacks. The proposed physical model and buffer safeguard provide an effective system state recovery toward maintaining flight stability. We implement VIMU on PX4 autopilot. The evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness of VIMU in detecting and mitigating various realistic sensor attacks, especially stealthy attacks.
AB - Sensor attacks on robotic vehicles have become pervasive and manipulative. Their latest advancements exploit sensor and detector characteristics to bypass detection. Recent security efforts have leveraged the physics-based model to detect or mitigate sensor attacks. However, these approaches are only resilient to a few sensor attacks and still need improvement in detection effectiveness. We present VIMU, an efficient sensor attack detection and resilience system for unmanned aerial vehicles. We propose a detection algorithm, CS-EMA, that leverages low-pass filtering to identify stealthy gyroscope attacks while achieving an overall effective sensor attack detection. We develop a fine-grained nonlinear physical model with precise aerodynamic and propulsion wrench modeling. We also augment the state estimation with a FIFO buffer safeguard to mitigate the impact of high-rate IMU attacks. The proposed physical model and buffer safeguard provide an effective system state recovery toward maintaining flight stability. We implement VIMU on PX4 autopilot. The evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness of VIMU in detecting and mitigating various realistic sensor attacks, especially stealthy attacks.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105001387156
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105001387156#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1109/ACSAC63791.2024.00084
DO - 10.1109/ACSAC63791.2024.00084
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105001387156
T3 - Proceedings - Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC
SP - 1015
EP - 1031
BT - Proceedings - 2024 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2024
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 9 December 2024 through 13 December 2024
ER -