TY - JOUR
T1 - Voluntary corporate environmental initiatives and shareholder wealth
AU - Fisher-Vanden, Karen
AU - Thorburn, Karin S.
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from three anonymous referees, Dan Phaneuf, Tom Berglund, and Espen Eckbo, as well as seminar participants at BI, Harvard's Kennedy School, HKUST, IMD, NHH, the Rockefeller Center and the Tuck School at Dartmouth, Texas A&M, the universities of Amsterdam and Stavanger, and the SNEE 2009 annual conference. We thank Jonathan Choi, Hanna Breetz, Abe Holland, and Chetan Mehta for research assistance. This research was supported by the Rockefeller Center and the Lindenauer Center for Corporate Governance at the Tuck School of Business, both at Dartmouth College.
PY - 2011/11
Y1 - 2011/11
N2 - Researchers debate whether environmental investments reduce firm value or actually improve financial performance. We provide some compelling evidence on shareholder wealth effects of membership in voluntary environmental programs (VEPs). Companies announcing membership in EPA's Climate Leaders, a program targeting reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, experience significantly negative abnormal stock returns. The price decline is larger in firms with poor corporate governance structures, and for high market-to-book (i.e., high growth) firms. However, firms joining Ceres, a program involving more general environmental commitments, have insignificant announcement returns, as do portfolios of industry rivals. Overall, corporate commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions appear to conflict with firm value maximization. This has important implications for policies that rely on voluntary initiatives to address climate change. Further, we find that firms facing climate-related shareholder resolutions or firms with weak corporate governance standards - giving managers the discretion to make such voluntary environmentally responsible investment decisions - are more likely to join Climate Leaders; decisions that may result in lower firm value.
AB - Researchers debate whether environmental investments reduce firm value or actually improve financial performance. We provide some compelling evidence on shareholder wealth effects of membership in voluntary environmental programs (VEPs). Companies announcing membership in EPA's Climate Leaders, a program targeting reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, experience significantly negative abnormal stock returns. The price decline is larger in firms with poor corporate governance structures, and for high market-to-book (i.e., high growth) firms. However, firms joining Ceres, a program involving more general environmental commitments, have insignificant announcement returns, as do portfolios of industry rivals. Overall, corporate commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions appear to conflict with firm value maximization. This has important implications for policies that rely on voluntary initiatives to address climate change. Further, we find that firms facing climate-related shareholder resolutions or firms with weak corporate governance standards - giving managers the discretion to make such voluntary environmentally responsible investment decisions - are more likely to join Climate Leaders; decisions that may result in lower firm value.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jeem.2011.04.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jeem.2011.04.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:80955137534
SN - 0095-0696
VL - 62
SP - 430
EP - 445
JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
JF - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
IS - 3
ER -