TY - JOUR
T1 - Waiting to settle
T2 - Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
AU - Ali, S. Nageeb M.
N1 - Funding Information:
I could not have written this paper without the patient guidance and support of Susan Athey. I am grateful to two anonymous referees as well as Jon Levin and MuhametYildiz for their extensive comments and encouragement. I also thank David Baron, Doug Bernheim, Yossi Feinberg, Navin Kartik, Fahad Khalil, Peter Norman, Andreas Park, Andres Santos, Andy Skrzypacz, Steve Tadelis, Bob Wilson for their suggestions. This research has been generously supported by an Olin Fellowship in Law and Economics, and a Humane Studies Fellowship.
PY - 2006/9
Y1 - 2006/9
N2 - We study multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over their bargaining power. We show that if agents are extremely optimistic, there may be costly delays in an arbitrarily long finite game but if optimism is moderate, all sufficiently long games end in immediate agreement. We show that the game with extreme optimism is highly unstable in the finite-horizon, and we examine the ramifications of this instability on the infinite-horizon problem. Finally, we consider other voting rules, and show that the majority-rule may be more efficient than the unanimity rule when agents are optimistic.
AB - We study multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over their bargaining power. We show that if agents are extremely optimistic, there may be costly delays in an arbitrarily long finite game but if optimism is moderate, all sufficiently long games end in immediate agreement. We show that the game with extreme optimism is highly unstable in the finite-horizon, and we examine the ramifications of this instability on the infinite-horizon problem. Finally, we consider other voting rules, and show that the majority-rule may be more efficient than the unanimity rule when agents are optimistic.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33748039786
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 130
SP - 109
EP - 137
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -