TY - JOUR
T1 - When cooperation begets cooperation
T2 - The role of key individuals in galvanizing support
AU - McAuliffe, Katherine
AU - Wrangham, Richard
AU - Glowacki, Luke
AU - Russell, Andrew F.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
PY - 2015/12/5
Y1 - 2015/12/5
N2 - Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors (key individuals) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in—and provide testable hypotheses of—two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuas vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation?.
AB - Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors (key individuals) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in—and provide testable hypotheses of—two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuas vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation?.
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U2 - 10.1098/rstb.2015.0012
DO - 10.1098/rstb.2015.0012
M3 - Review article
C2 - 26503685
AN - SCOPUS:84945251147
SN - 0962-8436
VL - 370
JO - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
JF - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
IS - 1683
M1 - 20150012
ER -