Abstract
This article proposes a quantitative model to explain how human behavior affects a bilateral negotiation agreement under incomplete information and provides theoretical basis to support decisions with equilibrium information. A real option approach is applied to our model to represent incomplete information in the negotiation such as uncertain value of goods, strategic deferment, and decisional irreversibility of a competitor. This approach allows us to develop the conditions and probability of a negotiation agreement in analytical form solution. Numerical analysis shows that the probability is generally maximized when a seller offers prices whimsically and a buyer offers coherently.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages | 1874-1879 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| State | Published - Dec 1 2008 |
| Event | IIE Annual Conference and Expo 2008 - Vancouver, BC, Canada Duration: May 17 2008 → May 21 2008 |
Other
| Other | IIE Annual Conference and Expo 2008 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Canada |
| City | Vancouver, BC |
| Period | 5/17/08 → 5/21/08 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Science Applications
- Software
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering