Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature

S. Nageeb Ali, B. Douglas Bernheim, Alexander W. Bloedel, Silvia Console Battilana

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We model legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated, and the agenda setter cannot commit to future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite outcome in every equilibrium regardless of the initial default policy. Central to our results is a new condition on preferences, manipulability, that holds in rich policy spaces, including spatial settings and distribution problems. Our findings therefore establish that, despite the sophistication of voters and the absence of commitment power, the agenda setter is effectively a dictator.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3090-3128
Number of pages39
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume113
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2023

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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